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THE STANDING OF THE UNITED STATES:
HOW CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS SHOW
THAT STANDING DOCTRINE IS
LO OKING FOR ANSWERS IN ALL
THE WRONG PLACES

Edward A. Hartnett*
J.

BACKGROUND TO A PUZZLE

The Supreme Court insists that Article III of the Constitution
requires a litigant to have standing in order for her request for judi
cial intervention to constitute a "case" or "controversy" within the
jurisdiction of a federal court; it also insists that the "irreducible
constitutional minimum" of standing requires (1) that the litigant
suffer an "injury in fact"; (2) that the person against whom the judi
cial intervention is sought have caused the injury; and (3) that the
requested judicial intervention redress the injury.1 The requisite in
jury in fact, the Court repeatedly declares, must be "personal,"2
"concrete and particularized,"3 and "actual or imminent, not con
jectural or hypothetical."4
* Visiting Associate Professor (Fall 1998), Scholar in Residence (Spring 1999),
University of Virginia School of Law; Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; A.B.
1982, Harvard College; J.D. 1985, New York University School of Law. - Ed. Thanks to
Evan Caminker, John Harrison, John Jeffries, and Robert Pushaw for helpful comments.

1. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S.
Ct. 765, 772 (1999); Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784-87 (1998); Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1008 (1998); B,ennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
160-62 (1997); United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517
U.S. 544, 551 (1996); Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 542 (1986); Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (citations omitted for all
sources).
2. See, e.g., Department of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 772; Clinton v. City of New York, 118
S. Ct. 2091, 2099 (1998); Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
& n.1; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (noting that the
"gist of the question of standing" is whether the litigant has "a personal stake in the out
come") (citations omitted for all sources).
3. See, e.g., Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317; United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995);
Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 663; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted for all
sources).

4. See, e.g., Hays, 515 U.S. at 743; Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 663; Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted for all sources).
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In addition, the injury must be more than an "injury to the inter
est in seeing that the law is obeyed."5 This requirement has its
foundation in the bar against standing to litigate a '"generalized
grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens."6 For a time, the bar on '"generalized griev
ance[s]"' was viewed as merely a "prudential rule[]," not required
by Article III and therefore subject to displacement by Congress.7
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lujan, however, treated it as
a gloss on the injury requirement and rooted in the case or contro
versy language of Article III.8 The Court insisted, as an Article III
matter, that the injury must be to something more than "every citi
zen's interest in the proper application of the Constitution and
laws," and the litigant must not be "seeking relief that no more di
rectly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large."9
Last year, the Court acknowledged that this bar on generalized
grievances has been treated sometimes as a constitutional limit and
sometimes as a prudential limit on standing.10 Significantly, it did
not choose between characterizations, but instead subdivided the
bar on generalized grievances into a prudential rule and a constitu
tional rule. The prudential rule counsels hesitation before finding
standing because "a political forum may be more readily available
where an injury is widely shared."11 The constitutional rule re
quires that the injury not be "of an abstract and indefinite nature for example, harm to the 'common concern for obedience to
5. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786.
6. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (describing bar on standing "when the

asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a
large class of citizens" as a "prudential rule[ ]") (citations omitted); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at
751.
7. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.

8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 ("We have consistently held that a plaintiff ... claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large - does not state an Article III case or controversy."). Justice Kennedy's concurrence
specifically noted:
The Court's holding . . is a direct and necessary consequence of the case and contro
versy limitations found in Article III. [I]t would exceed those limitations if
in the
absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate
the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws. While it does
not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party
bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
10. See Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785 ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit
on standing, the Court bas sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans
suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more
appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.").
11. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1786 (noting that the availability of a political forum to redress
widely shared injuries "counsel[s] against, say, interpreting a statute as conferring standing").
.

•
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law."'12 Later in the same passage, the Court purported to provide
another "example" of such an "abstract" harm, but instead simply
repeated that the harm cannot be "injury to the interest in seeing
that the law is obeyed."13
Numerous scholars have demonstrated that insistence on a 'per
sonal injury in fact as a requirement of Article III is a relatively
recent invention.14 They point to a long history in English courts, in
the courts of the several states, and in the federal courts themselves
of judicial proceedings brought by those who have not suffered any
such individualized injury in fact. For example, the prerogative
writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, as well as qui tam,
relator, and informer actions, could all be brought by litigants who
had suffered no injury in fact.1s

12. Akins, 118 S. Ct. at 1785 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also
Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond,
147 U. PA. L. RE.v. 613, 617 (1999) (noting that the Court in Akins "made clear, for the first
time, that Congress can grant standing to someone who suffers a quite generalized injury");
id. at 636 (describing the Court's "key step" as distinguishing between injuries that are
"widely shared" and "injuries that are 'abstract and indefinite,' . . . such as an injury 'to the
interest in seeing that the law is obeyed"'); The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Leading Cases,
Federal Jurisdiction & Procedure, 112 HARv. L. RE.v. 253, 260 (1998) [hereinafter Leading
Cases] (suggesting that Akins can be read "as embracing a definition of injury distinctly
broader and more accommodating than that in Lujan - a definition that distinguishes be
tween widely shared 'concrete' injuries . . . that are sufficient to confer standing and widely
shared 'abstract' injuries that are not").
13. Akins, 118

S. Ct. at

1786.

14. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Re
quirement?, 78 YALE LJ. 816 (1969) ; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE LJ. 221, 224-25 ( 1988); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1033 (1968) ; Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. RE.v. 1432 (1988) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Public Law]; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "In
juries," and Article III, 91 MICH.L. RE.v. 1 63, 166 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Stand
ing] (standing doctrine is "essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent ones at
that"); Steven L. Wmter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. RE.v. 1371 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 819 (prohibition), 820 (certiorari), 823 (quo war
ranto), 825-26 (informers or qui tam); Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1035 (prohibition, certiorari,
mandamus); Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 170-79; Wmter, supra note 14, at
1396 (mandamus, prohibition, certiorari), 1404 (mandamus in federal court), 1406-09 (in
former or qui tam). But see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs:
The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. RE.v.1001, 1008 (1997) (arguing that "a 'personal
stake' or standing was indeed necessary to invoke the power of English courts in prerogative
proceedings during the eighteenth century"). In reaching this conclusion, however, Clanton
frequently observes that such actions "were brought by a relator in the name of the king" and
were "understood to be the king's suit." Id. at 1033; see also id. at 1037 (contending that
"fatal flaw" in Berger's argument is that quo warranto information, as a relator action, "was
understood to be the suit of the king"); id. at 1041 (noting that "relator actions . . . were
understood to be the king's actions"). In such circumstances, Clanton simply deems the rela
tor's standing to be "irrelevant." Id. at 1037-38; 1042. This declaration does nothing to un
dermine the idea that the relators could initiate such actions without themselves having
suffered an injury.
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Most scholars reach the same conclusion from this history as
Justice Harlan did in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen:1 6 there is nothing
in the "judicial power," or "cases" and "controversies" language
that requires the person bringing the action to suffer an injury in
fact.17 For better or worse, however, the judges of the "inferior"
federal courts do not feel so free to disregard Supreme Court prece
dent.18 Their difficulty in following this precedent has been acute in
cases where the ancient forms persist, particularly qui tam actions.
In a qui tam action, an individual who has herself suffered no
harm brings an action on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the
government. Indeed, the term qui tam is short for "qui tam pro
domino rege quam pro se ipso sequitur" - "who as well for the
lord the king as for himself sues."19 The individual bringing the
action is typically called an "informer" or a "relator."20 As the
Supreme Court explained in 1905:
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself
had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by
statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and
in this country ever since the foundation of our Government. The
right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by the statute is fre-

16. 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) {Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing, in part, to the history of qui
tam actions, and noting that "[t]his and other federal courts have repeatedly held that indi
vidual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have standing as 'representatives of
the public interest"' and that it is "clear that non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs ...are not constitu
tionally excluded from the federal courts" (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio v. Commn., 316
U.S.4, 14 {1942))). See also F/ast, 392 U.S. at 130 (concluding that public actions are "within
the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Article III .. . ).
"

17. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 14, at 840 {"In sum, the notion that the constitution de
mands injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitutional
action is historically unfounded. ...There may well be policy arguments in favor of a 'per
sonal interest' limitation on standing, but they cannot rest on historically-derived constitu
tional compulsions."); Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1043 {"The burden of my argument
has
been that there are no compelling constitutional reasons for denying jurisdiction of citizen
and taxpayer actions. It is almost impossible any longer to contend that a Hohfeldian plain
tiff is a necessary element of a case or controversy."); Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at
1478-79 (presenting view that Article III requires an injury in fact is "misguided"); Winter,
supra note 14, at 1374 ("A fuller account of our history shows that article III was not limited
to the kinds of private disputes characterized by standing."). See also Richard H.Fallon, Jr.,
Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REv. 343, 385 (1993) (noting that
"a standing doctrine that is rooted in the requirement of injury in fact lacks intellectual
coherence").
.

.

•

18. See generally Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece
dents?, 46 STAN.L. REv. 817 (1994).
19. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY {2d ed.1989); see also 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTA
160 {facsimile of first edition 1768) (U.Chi.Press 1979) (giving full Latin as "qui tam
pro domino rege, &c., pro seipso in hac parte sequitur," thus indicating that the action was
brought only "in part" ("in hac parte") for himself but also for the king and the rest ("&c.")
- presumably the rest of the co=unity); cf. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutional
ity of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 n.1 {1989) (providing a slightly different
version).
20. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 341-42 n.1.

·

RIES

June 1999]

Standing Doctrine

2243

quently given to the first common informer who brings the action,
although he has no interest in the matter except as informer.21

Although qui tam statutes have been part of federal law from the
first Congress,22 the major such statute in current use is the False
Claims Act.2 3 The False Claims Act permits any person to sue a
. defendant accused of defrauding the government and, if successful,
to keep a percentage of the amount recovered.2 4
Current standing doctrine and deeply rooted qui tam practice
are on a collision course. It is not surprising that qui tam defend
ants have argued that current standing doctrine renders the qui tam
provision of the False Claims Act unconstitutional. Nor is it sur
prising that federal courts have almost universally rebuffed the
challenges to such a long-standing practice. Indeed, courts fre
quently use the argument of historical pedigree to uphold the con
stitutionality of qui tam actions.2 5 As one court put it, "The
concept of qui tam is so deeply rooted in the nation's history that it
is most improbable that any court today could divine some infirmity
of constitutional magnitude which would not have been equally ap
parent many decades, if not centuries, ago."2 6
One bold district court held the qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act unconstitutional, brushing aside its historical roots by
candidly noting that the Supreme Court's current standing doctrine
is a recent invention.27 But other courts, seeking to reconcile the
21. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (rejecting a constitutional attack on a
state statute because to accept it "would be in effect to hold invalid all legislation providing
for proceedings in the nature of qui tam actions"); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (rejecting an argument that qui tam statutes are judicially
disfavored and should be strictly construed, and noting that "[q]ui tam suits have been fre
quently permitted by legislative action, and have not been without defense by the courts"
(footnotes omitted)).
22. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 342-43.
23. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
24. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(l) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of sec
tion 3729 for the person and for the United States Government."). In general, if the execu
tive branch of the United States intervenes in the action, the relator's recovery ranges from
15 to 25 percent; if it does not intervene, the range is 25 to 30 percent. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d).
25. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Texas, 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir.
1992); see also United States ex rel Hall v. Tribal Development Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212-13
(7th Cir. 1995) (upholding standing to bring a qui tam action under 25 U.S.C. §§ 81 & 201).
26. United States ex rel Rudd v. Gen. Contractors, No. C-89- 397-R JM, at 4 (E.D. Wash.
Dec. 4, 1990), quoted in United States ex rel Burch v. Piqua Engineering, 803 F. Supp. 115,
117 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
27. See United States ex rel Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 1261, 1267
(S.D. Tex. 1997) ("The Court's modem conception of standing, as an Article III requirement,
did not come into being until relatively recently." (citing James T. Blanch, Note, The Consti
tutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL. 701, 72122 (1993))); see also Blanch, supra, at 723 ("To point at history and argue that standing doc
trine cannot screen out qui tam actions is to ignore the fact that at one time Article III had an
entirely different screening mechanism than it has now."); Thomas R. Lee, Co=ent, The
Standing of Qui Tam Realtors Under the False Claims Act, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 543, 549 (1990)
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history of qui tam actions with current standing doctrine, bend over
backwards (indeed, so far as to create a circle) in their eagerness to
find an injury in fact. Some conclude that the bounty provided to a
qui tam relator somehow constitutes an injury in fact.28 Although
the Supreme Court itself may have encouraged such an approach
by distinguishing qui tam actions from "citizen suits" along these
lines,29 it has aptly been described by one district judge as "put[ting]
the cart before the horse."30 Ironically, that same judge traced a
different circle to find an injury in fact, reasoning that a qui tam
relator is injured because she runs the risk of retaliation for filing
the qui tam action itself.31
The most interesting approach taken by some courts (or at least
the one of most significance for this article) is not to look for an
injury in fact to the qui tam relator, but instead to look for an injury
in fact to the United States and treat the relator as either a repre
sentative or an assignee of the United States.32 In the cases covered
("Standing is a modem game, and courts that uphold qui tam on historical grounds are play
ing by archaic rules. ").
28. See, e.g., United States ex reL Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc, 714 F. Supp. 1084,
1098-99 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that the bounty is enough to create an injury in fact);
Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(concluding that because of bounty, qui tam plaintiff "has suffered 'injury' of the constitu
tional magnitude required ").
29. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992) (distinguishing from
citizen suits "the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the
outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government's benefit, by providing a cash
bounty for the victorious plaintiff').
30. Burch, 803 F. Supp. at 118. Such a legislatively-created bounty can be (and may have
been) understood to give the informer a property interest, see Clanton, supra note 15, at
1040, but it is circular to count such a bounty as itself an "injury. "
31. See, e.g., Burch, 803 F. Supp. at 119 (finding standing based on "potential ramifica
tions to their employment status by initiating an action under the FCA ").
32. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Development Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1213
(1995) (noting "that the United States is the real plaintiff in qui tam actions " and treating the
relator as the government's representative); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d
743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he FCA effectively assigns the government's claims to qui tam
plaintiffs . . . . ); Stillwell, 714 F. Supp. at 1097 (observing that the "private plaintiff' is "in
effect, suing on the injury to the United States "); United States ex rel. Amin v. George Wash
ington University, 26 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 n.1 (D.D.C. 1998) ("The relator merely acts as the
United States' agent in pursuing the claim."). See generally Caminker, supra note 19, at 38183 (treating qui tam relator as representative of United States and analogous to a partial
assignment); Lee, supra note 27, at 563-68 (treating qui tam relator as government's
assignee).
One result of this approach is that it seems to authorize qui tam actions against states,
despite the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that qui tam suit is not
barred by Eleventh Amendment), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 2391 (1999). But see United States
ex reL Foulds v. Texas Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that state retained
Eleventh Amendment immunity against qui tam relator); Stevens, 162 F.3d at 224 (Weinstein,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "[w]hile the notion of a qui tam relator 'standing in the shoes of
the United States may be sufficient to confer standing, it is not sufficient to effect a transfer
of the federal government's exemption from state sovereign immunity "). Cf. United States
ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Tech. Inst., 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that states
"
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by the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, the injury to the
United States is easy to see: if it has been defrauded, it has lost
money - a classic injury in fact.3 3
Notice the assumption of this approach: the United States, no
less than any other litigant, must have suffered an injury in fact in
order for litigation brought on its behalf to constitute a case or con
troversy within the federal judicial power.3 4 Of course, this seems a
reasonable assumption for a lower federal court to make. After all,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the words "case" or
"controversy" in Article III require an injury in fact.3 5 And nothing
in Article III remotely suggests that the United States can litigate
something other than a "case" or "controversy" in an Article III
court.
Despite its apparent reasonableness under current Supreme
Court doctrine, I submit that no federal judge, if pressed, would
seriously contend that Article III requires that the United States
must suffer an injury in fact that is "personal," "concrete and partic
ularized," and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"
before litigation on its behalf can be brought in federal court. And
no federal judge would contend that injury to the United States be
more than an "abstract ... injury to the interest in seeing that the
law is obeyed . . . ."3 6 My point of pressure is a federal criminal
prosecution. That is, while Akhil Amar has argued that "too few of
those who write in criminal procedure do serious, sustained scholar
ship in constitutional law generally, or in fields like federal jurisdicare not "persons" within meaning of the False Claims Act). See generally Jonathan R. Siegel,
The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEXAS L.
REv. 539 (1995) (relying on qui tam history to argue that Congress can abrogate state sover
eign immunity by authorizing private persons to bring suit in the name of the United States).
The Court's recent decision in Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), suggests that it is not
likely to regard qui tam suits as sufficient to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity for rea
sons rooted in Article II. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (distinguishing individual action from
one "commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the United States by those
who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe
cuted,' U.S. CONST. art. II§ 3").
33. For a discussion of the Article II implications of treating the relator as a representa
tive of the United States, see infra text accompanying notes 92-97.
34. See, e.g., Hal� 49 F.3d at 1213 ("[I]t is enough that the United States, as the repre
sented party, has been injured."); Kelly, 9 F.3d at 748 ([Q]ui tam plaintiffs "may sue based
upon an injury to the federal treasury."); United States ex reL Kreindler v. United Technolo
gies, 985 F.2d 1148, 1154 (2nd Cir. 1993) (plaintiff in qui tam action "invokes the standing of
the government resulting from the fraud injury"); United States ex rel. Milam v. University of
Texas, 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The government, and not the relator, must have
suffered the 'injury in fact' required for Article III standing."); Amin, 26 F. Supp. at 168 n.l
("In a qui tam action, the United States suffers the injury and remains the true plaintiff, the
party whose standing is at issue . . . ."). But see Lee, supra note 27, at 570 (claiming that
standing doctrine makes an "exception" to the injury requirement "where the government
itself acts as plaintiff").
35. For examples, see the cases cited supra in notes 1-3.
36. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1786 (1998).
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tion and remedies,"37 I suggest that constitutional law, federal
jurisdiction, and remedies might learn something from criminal pro
cedure. By focusing in Part II on criminal prosecutions, a common
place legal proceeding familiar to today's lawyers and judges, my
hope is that those who have been unmoved by the history of pre
rogative writs and qui tam actions will see that Article III cannot
require an injury in fact.38 Similarly, I use criminal procedure to
show in Part III that the separation of powers issues now treated
under the rubric of Article III standing are better understood as
issues of Article I and Article II.
II.

CRIMINAL CA SES AND THE NONSENSE OF

REQUIRING
INJURY IN FACT UNDER ARTICLE III

Suppose a new assistant federal defender, steeped in the
Supreme Court's modern standing doctrine, moves to dismiss each
of the prosecutions brought against her clients on the grounds that
the United States lacks standing. She argues that the United States
lacks a personal, concrete, and particularized injury in fact and
therefore there is no case or controversy within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.
I suppose that the first reaction would be the one I received as a
new assistant federal defender when, at my first court appearance, I
argued that my client - a previously deported alien charged with
illegal reentry into the United States with whom I had little or no
time to speak beforehand - was not a flight risk because the ac
tions of which he was accused demonstrated that he really wanted
to be in this country.39 But after the laughter subsided, what would
the prosecutor and the judge say? What is the "concrete and partic
ularized" injury in fact suffered by the United States that gives it
standing to bring a criminal prosecution?
Some crimes, of course, cause an actual, concrete, particularized
injury to the United States. For example, when someone steals
property belonging to the United States,40 the United States suffers
such an injury - just as some courts in qui tam cases observe that
the United States suffers such an injury when it is defrauded of
money. But in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions, the
37. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 115 (1997).
38. Cf. Maxwell Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PENN.
L. REv. 309, 446 {1995) (treating standing of criminal defendants as "core" example of cases
in which litigants are "interested in seeking relief on their own with no larger agenda").
39. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides for the temporary detention of anyone "not a
citizen of the United States or lawfully admitted for permanent residence" who "may flee,"
18 U.S.C. § 3142{d) (1994), so there was little hope of success with more conventional argu·
ments at this first judicial appearance.
40. See 18 U. S.C. § 641 ("Whoever . ..steals . ..any record, voucher, money, or thing of
value of the United States" shall be fined and imprisoned.).
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United States is not seeking redress for this kind of an injury to
itself.
Perhaps one might be tempted to say that the injury in fact re
quired by Article III is the one suffered by the victim of the crime:
for example, the person who was kidnapped and taken across state
lines41 or the person who was defrauded by a pyramid scheme using
the U.S. Mails.42 On this theory, the United States has a form of
third-party standing allowing it to redress the injuries suffered by
others. But this approach is deeply flawed. If the United States
had third-party standing, one would expect the "first-party" - the
victim - to have standing. But our long-standing practice (albeit
one not required by Article III) is that the victim of the crime may
not bring a federal criminal prosecution.43 And criminal punish
ments such as probation, incarceration, and fines payable to the
United States do little to redress injuries suffered by the victim.44
Moreover, in the most common federal prosecution - possession
and sale of illegal drugs45 - there is no identifiable victim at all.
Alternatively, although this may not come with good grace from
a prosecutor, one might try to shift the focus to the defendant and
contend that the relevant injury is the one that the government is
seeking to impose on the defendant.46 This dodge cannot succeed
41. See 18 U.S.C.§ 1201 ("Whoever unlawfully ...kidnaps ...any person ...when the
person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign co=erce" shall be punished by
imprisonment.).
42. See 18 U.S.C.§ 1341 ("Whoever, having devised ...a scheme or artifice to defraud
... for the purpose of executing such scheme ... places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever" shall be fined and imprisoned.).
43. See Harold J.Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Les
sons From History, 38 AM. U.L .REv. 275, 293 (noting that Judiciary Act of 1789 "implicitly
vested the district attorneys with exclusive authority to prosecute all federal crimes within
their jurisdiction"); id. at 292, 296 (noting that " Congress never vested victims with a general
right to prosecute defendants under federal criminal provisions" and that although "citizens
in the first years under the Constitution evidently presented evidence of crimes directly to
the grand jury," even if the grand jury indicted, the district attorney retained control and
could drop the prosecution). Krent also argues that qui tam actions were considered "quasi
criminal." Id. at 296-303.

44. Cf. Steel Co.v. Citizens for a B etter Envt., 118 S. Ct.1003, 1019 (1998) ("[A]lthough
a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not
cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the nation's laws are faithfully en
forced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article ill remedy because it does not
redress a cognizable Article ill injury."). But see Steel Co., 118 S. Ct.at 1029 ( Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "imposing a sanction on the wrongdoer ...minimize[s] the risk that
harm-causing conduct will be repeated").
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. "Drug cases ... now occupy one-third of the federal court
caseload" of crimes. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CruM!NAL LAW, AMERICAN
BAR AssoCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 20 (1998). In the federal crimi
nal cases closed in 1997, more than 35% of defendants were charged with drug offenses,
double the next highest category. Id. at 89 (table indicating 35.3% for drug laws and 17.1%
for fraud).
46. Cf. Steams, supra note 38, at 441-42 (noting that a criminal defendant has standing to
challenge his conviction and that "[u]nless the courts address the claims on the merits, the
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without destroying the doctrine, however, because any defendant in
any litigation - including Secretary Lujan - is threatened with an
injury to liberty or property by an adverse judgment. If the injury
threatened to a defendant by the litigation itself suffices to establish
the plaintiff's standing to bring the action, then the standing re
quirement is truly an empty one.
At this point, even a patient judge (or reader) might be ready to
throw up her hands and say, "The United States isn't any ordinary
litigant. A federal criminal prosecution is not designed to remedy
the injury to any particular victim, but rather to remedy an injury
done to the community. It is wrong to try to shoehorn the United
States in the mold of a common law private litigant. It is the sover
eign, seeking to vindicate the general public interest in compliance
with the law."47
I agree, but it still does not solve the problem under current
standing doctrine.48 For the very point of the current doctrine is to
exclude from federal court those who seek to vindicate the general
public interest in compliance with the law, to treat an injury to
"every citizen's interest in the proper application of the Constitu
tion and the laws" as insufficient to invoke federal judicial power,
and to insist that Article III prevents Congress from authorizing
litigation where the "harm at issue is . . . of an abstract and indefi
nite nature - for example, harm to the common concern for obedi
ence to law."49 In short, if current standing doctrine is correct, then
the vast majority of federal criminal prosecutions are not "cases" or
"controversies" and the United States lacks standing to initiate
them.
convicted criminal will incur the most severe consequences that the state or federal govern
ment can impose ").
47. See Lee, supra note 27, at 569 ("The government certainly has standing in criminal
cases .. .."); Siegel, supra note 32, at 554 ("The United States is generally a proper party to
bring suit to enforce federal law . . .."); cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State
Standing, 81 VA. L. REv. 387, 392 (1995) (noting that when a state "prosecutes criminal and
civil actions under its own laws in its own courts, no issue ordinarily arises as to its standing ").
A closely related argument would posit certain "personal " interests unique to the sover
eign. While perhaps this might have some force in a monarchy in which sovereignty is per
sonified in the king, cf. Clanton, supra note 15, at 1038 ("[T)he king was clearly the most
interested party in executing the criminal laws."), it is not persuasive in a nation established
on the principle that governments "deriv[e] their just power from the consent of the gov
erned, " DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) , and whose constitution is
made in the name of "We the People." U.S.CoNST.preamble.
48. Cf. Lee, supra note 27, at 570 (contending that the government has "special constitu
tional status as plaintiff ...and it need not show a particularized injury as a predicate to
sue."); Larry W.Yackle, Worthy Champions of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United
States As Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. L. REv. 111, 135-37 (1997) (suggesting that since modem
standing doctrine was created to protect the executive, it "makes little sense, then, to tum
standing doctrine against the Executive . ..") .
49. Federal Election Commn. v.Akins, 118 S. Ct.1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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Of course, this is an absurd result. Article III cannot sensibly be
read to prohibit the United States from vindicating its sovereign
interests in its own courts. Removed from its context and recast as
a general principle, then, Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that
"[t]he province of the judiciary is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals" is simply wrong.50 So, too, is Justice Scalia's assertion
that "[v]indicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress
and the Chief Executive,"51 with courts restricted to "protecting in
dividuals and minorities against impositions of the majority ...." 52
Courts do not exist solely to resolve private disputes or to re
solve claims by injured individuals against the government or gov
ernment officials. Instead, as criminal prosecutions attest, a
significant role of courts is simply to enforce the sovereign's law in
particular cases.s3
One caveat is in order. Article III extends the judicial power of
the United States to certain "cases" 54as well as certain "controver
sies." 55 A number of scholars suggest that the term "cases" in
Article III includes criminal prosecutions, while the term "contro
versies" does not.56 If they are right, then the foregoing critique,
relying as it does on the example of criminal prosecutions, shows
only that the word "case" in Article III cannot reasonably be un
derstood to require a personal, concrete, and particularized injury
50.
51.
52.

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
504 U.S.555, 576 (1992).

Lujan v.Defenders of Wildlife,

Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L.REv. 881, 894 (1983).
53. See Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUM.L.REv. 1001,

1005 (1965) (noting that "government cannot be run without the use of courts for the en
forcement of coercive sanctions").
54. U.S.CoNsT.art. Ill,§ 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases ...arising
under this Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.
").
55. U.S. CoNST.art.III,§ 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to ...Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; be
tween a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subject.").
56. See, e.g., William A.Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L.REv. 263, 266 (1990) (suggesting that this ex
planation of the difference between "cases" and "controversies" "seems conclusive"); John
Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and the Text
ofArticle Ill, 64 U. Cm.L.REv. 203, 210, 220-47 (1997) ("Cases include all legal actions, civil
and criminal, while controversies include only civil proceedings.
"); Daniel J.Meltzer, The
History and Structure ofArticle Ill, 138 U.PA.L.REv. 1569, 1575-76 (1990) (supporting this
distinction and noting its consistency with the Judiciary Act of 1789); James E.Pfander, Re
thinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL.L.REv. 555,
605 (1994) (noting that "the term 'cases' includes both criminal and civil proceedings,
whereas the term 'controversies' embraces only matters of a civil nature"); Sunstein, What's
Standing, supra note 14, at 168.
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in fact. It tells us nothing about whether the word "controversy" in
Article III can be understood to require this kind of injury.
Professor Robert Pushaw draws a different distinction between
"cases" and "controversies." He contends that the key difference is
that the primary judicial role in "controversies" is the resolution of
particular disputes while the primary judicial role in "cases" is the
exposition of legal norms. 57 Although there is some ambiguity in
Pushaw's use of the term, he views "exposition" - the claimed ju
dicial role in "cases" - as simply the interpretation and application
of the law to particular facts, regardless of the existence of any pre
existing private dispute, in order to secure the enforcement of that
law.SS
57. See Robert J. Pushaw, Article Ill's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Func
tion of Federal Courts, 69 NoTRE DAME L.REv. 447, 494 (1994) ("[T]he federal judiciary's
primary role was to be exposition in 'Cases,' with a lesser function of resolving disputes in
'Controversies."'). This distinction may be helpful in understanding why some heads of fed
eral ·jurisdiction are defined by legal subject and some are defined by party status. In
Pushaw's view, current standing doctrine takes concepts that make some sense as applied to
"controversies" and erroneously applies them in "cases" as well. Id. at 519 ("The Court's
basic problem lies in applying fiusticiability doctrines such as standing] - and their underly
ing dispute resolution model of adjudication - exclusively to 'Cases' . . . which primarily
involve federal law declaration. Conversely, justiciability doctrines are not used where they
would make the most sense: to limit the 'Controversies' (i.e., disputes) federal courts must
resolve.").
58. See, e.g., Robert Pushaw, Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REv. 847, 851
(parenthetically defining exposition to be "interpret[ing] and apply[ing]" the law) [herein
after Pushaw, Congressional Power]; Pushaw, supra note 57, at 474 (defining exposition as
"the process of determining, construing, and applying legal rules"); cf. Robert Pushaw, Jus
ticiabi/ity and Separation ofPowers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORN. L.REv. 393, 399
(1996) (parenthetically defining "judicial power" as "the interpretation and application of
pre-existing legal rules to particular facts"). Pushaw treats "exposition" and "expound" as
cognates; definition 3 of the word "expound" in THE OXFORD ENGLISH D1cnoNARY (2d ed.
1989), is "to give a particular interpretation to," a usage it describes as "now chiefly in law."
Pushaw might be read, however, to suggest that the judicial role in cases is not so much
the enforcement of law through the issuance of judgments, but the explanation and elabora
tion of legal norms, ideally in published opinions. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 57, at 449
(claiming that a judge's "primary role" in a "case" is to "answer the legal question presented"
and that a court's "main function" in "cases" is "to declare the law in matters of national and
international importance"); id. at 517 ("The expository function could be exercised solely in a
public judicial proceeding, culminating in a published opinion."). Such a view of the judicial
role would be wrong, see Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter ofJudgment, Not a Matter of Opin
ion, 14 N.Y.U. L.REv. 123, 126 (1999) ("The operative legal act performed by a court is the
entry of a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment."), and
in a letter commenting on a prior draft of this article, Pushaw has stated that the interpreta
tion of "exposition" contained in the text is the one he intended. Letter from Robert Pushaw
to author, March 25, 1999, at 4; see also Pushaw, Congressional Power, supra, at 860
(parenthetically defining "judicial power" as "the authority to render a final judgment after
applying the law to particular facts"). Moreover, treating the judicial role in cases as enforce
ment of law rather than explanation of law permits the analysis to extend readily to federal
trial courts. As criminal prosecutions illustrate, federal trial courts have a major role in ap
plying the law to particular facts in order to secure the enforcement of the law. Cf. Pushaw,
supra note 57, at 527 n.377 (conceding that "federal district courts probably have at least as
important a role in settling disputes as they do in interpreting federal law" and concluding
that "my analysis principally applies to federal appellate courts").
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In criminal cases (and perhaps more generally in Article III
"cases"), the judiciary is enforcing the sovereign's law rather than
umpiring a preexisting dispute.s9 Thus, criminal prosecutions
demonstrate that, at least when exercising jurisdiction over the
"cases" enumerated in Article III, nothing in Article III limits the
use of the federal judicial power to enforcement of the rights of
individuals or prohibits the use of the federal judicial power to en
force the majoritarian sovereign will.
In short, if - as all concede - the United States can prosecute
crimes in the federal courts, then a "case" within the meaning of
Article III must include litigation that is based on nothing more
than the "harm to the common concern for obedience to law,"60
and the "abstract ...injury to the interest in seeing that the law is
obeyed."61
III.

WHAT STANDING Is REALLY ABoUT: THE ARTICLE I
AND II lssUES

If current standing doctrine is so thoroughly wrong, why have so
many Supreme Court Justices insisted that it is a fundamental as
pect of constitutional separation of powers? I subinit that there are
separation of powers concerns afoot, but they are more properly
considered as arguments primarily about the meaning of Articles I
and II, not Article III.
A.

The Article I Issue

A number of scholars have persuasively argued that the
Supreme Court's efforts to treat standing as a transsubstantive juris
dictional issue are Inisguided.62 They explain that the question of
standing is best treated as a question indistinguishable from
59. See Pfander, supra note 56, at 616 (noting that a clause that "refers to 'cases' ...thus
deals primarily with the enforcement of federal law"); cf. Harrison, supra note 56, at 231-32
(noting that "cases" include criminal prosecutions under federal statutes, state prosecutions
met by federal defenses, and criminal prosecutions of foreign diplomatic or consular officers,
while most "controversies" would be between individuals, so the term underlines the private
nature of such disputes).
60. Federal Election Commn.v. Akins, 118 S. Ct 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
61. Akins, 118 S. Ct at 1786. I do not mean to attack all Article III justiciability doc
trines; my criticism is limited to current standing doctrine. In particular, I have no quarrel
with the ban on advisory opinion or the finality doctrine. See Hartnett, supra note 58, at 14546 (supporting these doctrines and noting that the "central feature that constitutes a 'case' or
'controversy' is that it results in a judgment").
62. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 14, at 233 (injury-in-fact requirement "impedes rather
than assists analysis" because question regarding injury "must be seen as part of the question
of the nature and scope of the substantive legal right on which the plaintiff relies"); id. at 291
(standing "is a question of substantive law").
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whether the party has a right of action.63 Phrased this way, the is
sue is one of substantive and remedial law, not one of Article III
jurisdiction.64
Such scholarly efforts to dismantle Article III standing doctrine
and redirect attention to the issues of substantive and remedial law,
however compelling on their own terms, do not make the separa
tion of powers concerns that judges have forced into that doctrine
disappear. Instead, the question becomes whether the judiciary
may create rights of action and remedies on its own or whether it
must instead wait for legislative action. 65 Some argue that the crea
tion of rights of action and their accompanying remedies are (unless
constitutionally required66) legislative questions left to Congress
63. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 450-56 (1974) (standing question is whether
there is private right of action); Fletcher, supra note 14, at 239 ("The essence of a standing

inquiry is the meaning of the specific statute or constitutional provision upon which the plain
tiff relies . . . ."); Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1475 ("[T]he existence of standing
and the existence of a cause of action present the same basic question."); Sunstein, What's
Standing, supra note 14, at 166 ("The relevant question is instead whether the law - gov
erning statutes, the Constitution, or federal co=on law - has conferred on the plaintiffs a
cause of action."); Wmter, supra note 14, at 1451 ("For over a hundred years, the metaphor
of 'standing' was shorthand for the question of whether a plaintiff had asserted claims that a
court of equity would enforce."); id. at 1470 ("'Standing' is and can only be a question about
the legal rights at stake."). Cf. Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Jus
ticiability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1382-83 (1995) (agreeing that standing is
"inevitably substantive, rather than procedural," while contending that standing doctrine, by
presumptively finding "no right to enforce the rights of others," "no right to prevent diffuse
harms," and "no right to an undistorted market" works to prevent litigants from manipulat
ing the path of the legal decisions).

64. Professor Sunstein attempts to maintain a link with Article III, contending that if
there is no cause of action, there is no "case" or "controversy." Sunstein, What's Standing,
supra note 14, at 222. If a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (or, under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a claim upon which relief can be granted), the dismissal is on the merits,
not for lack of jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (noting that it is "well
settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and
not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction").
65. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 233 ("In significant part, a debate over what constitutes
'injury in fact' sufficient for Article III is thus a debate about separation of powers and the
respective responsibilities of Congress and the Court.").
66. Individuals seeking to protect their own life and liberty have at least one constitution
ally required right of action and remedy: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may re
quire it." U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2. It has been held that the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation clause, U.S. CoNST. amend. 5, protects a constitutionally required right of ac
tion and remedy for the protection of property, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987), but the historical accuracy of this description has
recently been called into question. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The
Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 V AND. L. REv.
57 (1999). The extent to which the constitution requires the creation of additional rights of
action and remedies is uncertain. See generally Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HA.Rv. L. REv. 1733 (1991); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1999).
See also Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 210 (arguing that it is "implausible to say
that constitutional provisions create [private rights of action] when the relevant duty runs to
the public as a whole rather than to affected individuals").
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under Article I,67 while others argue that, at least in the first in
stance, courts properly create (or broadly infer) such rights of ac
tion and remedies.6s
So understood, the injury-in-fact requirement would be de
moted from a constitutional rule to a principle of statutory con
struction:69 in the absence of a clear statement from Congress to
the contrary, the judiciary will infer rights of action only for the

67. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("As the Legislative Branch, Congress . . . should determine when private parties
are to be given causes of action under legislation it adopts. . . . When Congress chooses not to
provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the legislative role of creat
ing such a remedy."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 427-30 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that, while Congress could create
right of action for damages against federal officials for violating the fourth amendment, the
Court may not do so); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
creation of right of action for damages is exercise of legislative power and "[l]egislation is the
business of Congress"); cf. Karahalios v. National Fedn. of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536
(1989) (refusing to recognize a private right of action and noting that "Congress undoubtedly
was aware . . . that the Court had departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim
urging that an implied statutory cause of action should be recognized, and that such issues
were being resolved by a straightforward inqniry into whether Congress intended to provide
a private cause of action"); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230 (1996)
(Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (implying a right of action under§ 10 of
the Voting Rights Act because Supreme Court precedent at the time the statute was enacted
was much more receptive to such inferences than current precedent).

See also Sunstein, Public Law, supra note 14, at 1475 ("[L]itigants do not have standing
unless Congress or the Constitution has granted them a right to bring suit."); Wmter, supra
note 14, at 1513 ("If standing is really about the right to be recognized and its concomitant
remedies, then Congress, and not the Court, should have the ultimate power to define
standing.").
68. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (establishing four part test for implying
right of action); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (implying private right of action for damages for
violation of fourth amendment in absence of "explicit congressional declaration" to the con
trary or "special factors counselling hesitation"); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)
(implying private right of action for damages as a "necessary supplement" to Securities &
Exchange Commission enforcement); see also Henry Monaghan, Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 1, 24 (1975) (treating Bivens as a form of constitutional common law,
inspired by the constitution but changeable by Congress); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 11112 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I would not be niggardly . . . in giving private attorneys
general standing to sue. I would certainly not wait for Congress to give its blessing to our
deciding cases clearly within our Article III jurisdiction."); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) ("Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do
not specifically either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed to
authorize him to sue.") (citation omitted).
69. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 239 (suggesting that standing precedents "are useful as
presumptions aids for construction"); see also id. at 252 (arguing that dismissals for lack of
prudential standing are better described and understood as refusals to "infer a cause of ac
tion absent a clear statutory directive"); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170,
1198-99 (1993) (arguing that all of the Court's opinions prior to Lujan were "consistent with
the principle of legislative supremacy"). Such a demotion of the injury-in-fact requirement
would be especially appropriate since the injury-in-fact requirement was born in an interpre
tation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at
185-86 (discussing ADP v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
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kinds of concrete, individualized, personal injuries that courts ex
pect to see vindicated by private rights of action.70
This, I think, is the essence of the position taken by Justice
Harlan: (1) public actions are within a federal court's Article III
jurisdiction,71 (2) federal courts should leave the creation of such
rights of action to Congress,72 but (3) federal courts may infer pri
vate rights of action when faced with a litigant who has suffered the
kind of concrete, individualized, personal injury that courts are
used to seeing vindicated by private rights of action.73 There is
70. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 672 ("Denials of standing in cases involving novel interests
foreign to the existing legal culture are therefore best understood as interpretations of the
underlying statute."). Under this approach, Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct.
1777 (1998) is readily reconcilable with United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (re
jecting taxpayer standing to litigate demand for regular statement and account from CIA): in
Akins, but not in Richardson, there was a Congressionally created right of action. See Sun
stein, supra note 12, at 642 (distinguishing Richardson from Akins and noting that if Richard
son was decided correctly it was because "no source of law created a right to bring suit");
Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 261 (making this point). Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (noting that the Court must be "sensitive to the articulation of new
rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition" but that "Con
gress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the
class of persons entitled to bring suit") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Flast, 392 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("This Court has previously held that
individual litigants have standing to represent the public interest, despite their lack of eco
nomic or other personal interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits.").
Concededly, Justice Harlan's Flast opinion speaks in terms of "standing" rather than "rights
of action."

73. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A] court of law vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit has the power - and therefore the duty - to
make principled choices among traditional judicial remedies."). Justice Harlan's emphasis on
the personal interests involved in Bivens appears throughout the opinion. See Bivens, 403
U.S. at 399 ("[A] traditional judicial remedy such as damages is appropriate to the vindica
tion of the personal interests [involved]."); 403 U.S. at 408 (noting "personal interests" pro
tected by fourth amendment); 403 U.S. at 409 (relying in part on "experience of judges in
dealing with private trespass and false imprisonment claims").
It might be thought that a similar rule should apply to civil litigation brought by the
United States. See United States v. San Jacinto Tm Co., 125 U.S. 273, 285 (1888) (suggesting
that, in the absence of a Congressionally created right of action, the United States could only
"institute such a suit . . . upon the same general principles which authorize a private citizen to
apply to a court of justice for relief'). Justice Field advocated even further restriction, refus
ing to "recognize the doctrine that the Attorney General takes any power by virtue of his
office except what the Constitution and the laws confer." San Jacinto, 125 U.S. at 307 (Field,
J., concurring in the judgment). The most prominent case rejecting this limitation should give
one pause before endorsing judicially-created rights of action to vindicate the public interest.
See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding injunction against Pullman strike of 1894
without need for Congressionally created right of action). In Debs, the Supreme Court ex
plicitly declined to rely on any Act of Congress, 158 U.S. at 600, or to place its decision solely
on the property interest of the United States in the mail carried on the railways, preferring to
rest its decision on broader grounds. 158 U.S. at 583-84. It reasoned that the "obligations
which [the executive branch of the United States] is under to promote the interest of all, and
to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is of itself suffi
cient to give it a standing in court." Debs, 158 U.S. at 584. Compare CHARLES B LACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1969) (approving Debs by
analogy to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)) with RICHARD H. FAL·
LON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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much to be said for Justice Harlan's approach74 - not the least of
which is that it was too conservative for the Warren Court and too
liberal for the Rehnquist Court.
Federal criminal prosecutions may have something to tell us
about this debate. For one of the earliest, most significant, and
most enduring decisions the federal judiciary has ever made was to
leave the creation of criminal rights of action to Congress and to
refuse to recognize a common law of federal crimes.75 To my mind,
the example of criminal prosecutions suggests the wisdom of insist
ing that it is the job of Congress, not the courts, to create rights of
action to vindicate the public's interest in obedience to the law.76
Yet even those who would distinguish criminal prosecutions
from other public rights of action77 and encourage greater judicial
creativity should, I believe, agree that this is the right set of ques
tions to be asking - that what is truly at stake in current standing
doctrine is not the meaning of "cases" and "controversies" in Arti
cle III, but the extent (and possible exclusivity) of the legislative
power of Article ps
816 n.3 (4th ed. 1996) (suggesting that there is a difference between affirmative rights of
action, as in Debs, and defenses, as in McCulloch). See also F ALLON ET AL., supra, at 817
(suggesting that the New York Trmes in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Trmes v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), perhaps should have argued that the United States
needed a Congressionally created right of action before it could bring suit); Henry P.
Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1993) (sug
gesting that Debs can be "at least understood," if not defended, as an example of the protec
tive power of the executive, without statutory authority, "to make contracts and, more
importantly, to sue to protect the personnel and property interests of the United States, and
when necessary to use force and other resources to protect them").
74. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 14, at 277 (describing Justice Harlan's opinion in Flast as
"widely admired").
75. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("The
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and
declare that Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."); Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S.
at 32 ("Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by this
Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion."). Significantly, the
Court in Hudson & Goodwin was willing to assume, at least arguendo, an implied power in
the United States to "preserve its own existence, and promote the end and object of its
creation," but insisted that it did not follow that the courts could act without an act of legisla
tion. 11 U.S. at 33-34. See also United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816)
(refusing to draw Hudson & Goodwin into doubt).
76. Cf. Steams, supra note 38, at 456 ("The injury in fact requirement . . . is intended to
protect Congress's power to govern. Critical to that power . . . is the power not to make law
unless and until an appropriate consensus forms.").
77. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 48, at 130 (suggesting that the executive should have a
right of action to enforce constitutional rights, even if "there are occasions," such as criminal
prosecutions, "when we might demand explicit congressional authority for suits to enforce
federal statutes").
78. Of course, one might rephrase the question to concern the appropriate scope of "judi
cial power" under Article III, and thus make it an Article III question. I don't deny that
what I describe as an Article I question can be thought of as an Article III question, or
(perhaps more precisely) as a question about the relative scope of Articles I and III. My
point in labeling it an Article I rather than an Article III question is to highlight the fact that
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The Article II Issue

Let us take stock of where we are. We have seen that there is
no impediment in Article III to a federal court enforcing the law of
the sovereign in the interests of the public, such as in a criminal
case.79 We have also seen that the strongest conclusion that we can
draw from Article I is that the judiciary should leave the creation of
rights of action to· vindicate the public interest to Congress, as in the
statutes creating federal crimes.so The constitutional question that
remains to be addressed is "Who can constitutionally be empow
ered to represent such public interests in court?" That is a question
of the proper interpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of
Article II.81
It is no coincidence that the Justice most dedicated to using the
doctrine of standing to bar actions seeking to vindicate the public
interest in law enforcement is the same Justice most dedicated to
the unitary executive: Justice Scalia. Before taking his seat on the
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of the
doctrine of standing to the separation of powers.82 On the Court,
he authored the majority opinion in Lujan. 83 He is also a firm be
liever in the unitary executive - the only Justice to conclude the
independent counsel statute is unconstitutional because it gives
purely executive functions to a person "whose actions are not fully
within the supervision and control of the President. "84 Although he
has denied that his views on standing are simply a dislocated ver
sion of his views on the unitary executive,85 he has explicitly stated
it has everything to do with the scope of the legislative power, and nothing to do with the
meaning of the terms "case" and "controversy."
79.
80.

See supra Part II.
See supra section III.A.
See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note

81.
14, at 213 ("[M]any of the recent standing
cases might be thought to be Article II cases masquerading under the guise of Article III.").
82.

See Scalia, supra note 52,

at 894.

83. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 {1992).

84. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988).
85. He wrote:
Our opinion is not motivated, as Justice Stevens suggests, by the more specific sepa
ration-of-powers concern that this citizen's suit "somehow interferes with the Execu
tive's power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3 . . . . " The
courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action, whether or not
exceeding that sphere will harm one of the other two branches. This case calls for noth
ing more than a straightforward application of our standing jurisprudence, which, though
it may sometimes have an impact on presidential powers, derives from Article III, and
not Article II.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (quoting 523 U.S. at 129
{Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). Cf. Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of
Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793, 1806 {1993) (relying on Article II's
unitary executive to conclude that "Congress should not be able to confer on private citizens
the general power to vindicate rights shared by the public as a whole."). Clanton, supra note
15, at 1040, n.251 (noting that a legislatively-created bounty might be a sufficient personal
stake for an informer action, but relying on Article II to conclude that "separation of powers
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that the reason (in his view) Congress cannot create citizen standing
to vindicate the public interest is that such citizen standing would
operate to transfer the President's most important duty: to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.s6
There is, of course, a large and ongoing debate about the mean
ing of Article II. There are those, such as Justice Scalia, who con
tend that Article II creates a unitary executive and that anyone
exercising any part of national executive power must be answerable
to the President.s7 There are others who contend that Article II is
perfectly consistent with creating officers and agencies who admin
ister the law with considerable autonomy from presidential con
troi.ss In addition, there are those who are willing to accept, at least
for purposes of argument, that the original understanding of Article
II was a unitary one, but that modern conditions require the accept
ance of greater autonomy of those with executive power.s9 There
are even those who argue that the original understanding accepted
considerable autonomy, but that modern conditions may call for a
unitary executive.9o
I do not attempt to resolve that debate, or even to enter into it.
Instead, my point is that this is the right set of questions to be askprinciples in the United States limit Congress' ability to give the public at large penalties to
prosecute others for breaches of law").
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. In his dissent in Akins, Justice Scalia reiterated the same
concern. "A system in which the citizenry at large could sue to compel executive compliance
with the law would be a system in which the courts, rather than the President, are given the
primary responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. II, § 3."
Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1791 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A
similar reliance on Article II appears in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Alden v.
Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999). There the Court held that Congress lacks the Article I power
to authorize private litigants to bring suits for money damages against unconsenting states,
but distinguished suits brought "in the name of the United States by those who are entrusted
with the constitutional duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3." Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2267.
87. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe
cute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Struc
tural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1792
(1996) (arguing that history does not support a formalist interpretation of the separation of
powers and that the "Constitution was a sketch that left the future resolution of separation of
powers matters mainly to the processes inked in at the highest levels of the three branches").
89. See, e.g., Abner Greene, Checks & Balances in an Era ofPresidential Lawmaking, 61
U. Cm. L. REv. 123, 128 (1994) ("[E]ven if in the nondelegation doctrine days Congress
could not constitutionally regulate presidential control of agency officials . . . in the post
nondelegation doctrine world such congressional actions restore a proper balance of power
consonant with the framers' view of checks and balances.").
90. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 86 (1994) (arguing that the framers distinguished between executive
power and administrative power, but suggesting that "[u]nder current circumstances, a
strongly unitary executive is the best way of keeping faith with the most fundamental goals of
the original scheme").
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ing - that what is truly at stake in current standing doctrine is not
the meaning of Article III, but the meaning of Article II.
Again, criminal cases illustrate the point. If Congress has,
within the scope of its enumerated powers under Article I, created
a federal crime, there is no constitutional impediment to its pro
secution in a federal court. Even if no one has suffered a concrete
particularized injury in fact and the only interest being vindicated is
the general public interest in law enforcement, and even if the judi
ciary would not infer a right of action absent the statute, there is a
"case" within the meaning of Article III. The remaining constitu
tional question is a question of Article II: Who can prosecute such
crimes and thereby vindicate the general public interest? The pos
sibilities include federal officials, private actors, and even Congress
or its members.91
Some might object that, regardless of the degree of indepen
dence from the President a criminal prosecutor is permitted by
Article II, the named party in the case will be the United States of
America, not the particular individual prosecutor. On this view, the
question is not who may prosecute crimes and vindicate the general
public interest, but rather who is permitted to represent the United
States.
Perhaps so, but this rather formal distinction only highlights that
the real issue is one under Article II, not Article III. For it would
be a simple matter for Congress, any time it wishes to empower
someone to vindicate the general public interest, to provide that the
person may sue in the name of the United States.92 Indeed, this is
precisely how the classic actions brought by private individuals to
vindicate the public interest were (and often still are) captioned:
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, qui tam, informer,
and relator actions were all brought in the name of the sovereign.93
91. State officials present another possibility, cf Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)
(permitting Maine standing to appeal from a federal court of appeals judgment in a federal
prosecution), but from the perspective of federal separation of powers, they can be assimi
lated to private actors. Cf Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding, as a
matter of federalism, that federal government cannot command state officers to enforce fed
eral regulatory program).
92. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (1994) (authorizing United States attorneys, not citizens gener
ally, to "prosecute for all offenses against the United States").
93. See, e.g., GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CERTIORARI AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER THE STATUTES § 1, at 2 (1893) (noting one definition of a writ of certiorari
as "an original writ . . . directed in the king's name" (quoting MATrHEW BACON, A NEW
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 162 (Sir Henry Gwyllin & Charles Edward Dodd eds., 1852)
(1768))); JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, EMBRACING
MANDAMUS, Quo WARRANTO, AND PROHIBmON § 430, at 419 (3d ed. 1896) (explaining that
mandamus proceedings are instituted in the name of the state or sovereign); id. § 697, at 65354 (noting the common law rule that quo warranto proceedings be instituted in the name of
the state or sovereign power). Such writs also came to be used to protect private interests.
See, e.g., HIGH, supra, § 430, at 419 (noting that use of the sovereign's name was treated as
"merely nominal"); S.S. MERILL, LAW OF MANDAMUS § 228, at 286 (1892) (recognizing
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On the other hand, perhaps, as the Court seemed to say in
v. Valeo,94 only officers of the United States, and not pri
vate individuals, can be constitutionally empowered to represent
the United States in court. There is reason to doubt such a broad
reading of Buckley, 95 particularly in light of subsequent doctrinal
developments that emphasize the prevention of Congressional ag
grandizement of power rather than Presidential control over the ex
ecution of the law.96 But even if the broad reading of Buckley is
correct, Congress may well be able to meet this formal requirement
by simply vesting the power of appointment in the court where the
action is filed.97

Buckley

"long-established" rule that a writ of mandamus "runs in the name of the state to protect
private interests"). See also Clanton, supra note 15, at 1033-41.
94. 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) ("[P]rimary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the
courts of the United States for vindicating public rights .. . may be discharged only by per
sons who are 'Officers of the United States'.").
95. See Caminker, supra note 19, at 374-80 (doubting that Buckley should be understood
as "enshrining a public/private interest distinction governing the appointments clause" and
suggesting that a one-shot litigant without authority over government employees need not be
an "officer"). See also, e.g., Auffmordt v.Hedden, 137 U.S.310, 327 (1890) (person "without
tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and [who] acts only occasion
ally and temporarily" is not "officer" of United States); United States ex reL Stillwell v.
Hughes Helicopters, 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1095 ( C.D. Cal. 1989) (interpreting Buckley as
"preventing Congress from attempting to enforce federal law"); United States ex reL Truong
v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp.615, 623 ( C.D. Cal.1989) (interpreting Court in Buckley as
"concerned that Congress was encroaching impermissibly on executive branch functions").
Office of L egal Counsel, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and
Congress, 1996 WL 876050 at § IIBl & n.66 (preliminary print, May 7, 1996) (concluding that
qui tam statute is constitutional under the best reading of Buckley, and explicitly disapprov
ing prior OL C opinion to the contrary).
96. See Morrison v.Olson, 487 U.S.654 (1988) (upholding independent counsel statute);
B owsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress may not place executive power
in a person answerable to Congress); IN S v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (permitting delega
tion of Congressional authority to IN S but invalidating legislative veto). See also Metropoli
tan Washington Airports Auth.v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.252
(1991) (holding on basic separation of powers grounds that members of Congress may not sit
on board that exercises executive power); Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 277 n.23 (declining to
address incompatibility cause, ineligibility clause, and appointments clause arguments); see
generally Greene, supra note 89, at 126 (" Congress may give away legislative power and
insulate such delegated power from total presidential control, but Congress may n[ot] draw
executive power to itself."); L essig & Sunstein, supra note 90, at 115-16 (arguing that
preventing Congress from having a role in the enforcement of law both preserves liberty and
reduces the incentives toward Congressional delegation).
97. U.S. CoNsr.art. II, § 2 ("[T]he Congress may by L aw vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of L aw, or in the
Heads of Departments."). Such a mechanism would not be valid if the litigant to be ap
pointed were considered a principal officer, who must be appointed by the President, see
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.651, 659 (1997), or if inferior officers may only be ap
pointed by their superiors. See Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L .REv. 747, 805
(1999) (arguing that inferior officers may only be appointed by their superiors); Akhil Amar,
Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L.REv. 647, 669 (1996) (arguing that "inter
branch appointments are ruled out by the relational word 'inferior' "). But see Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S.654, 673-74 (1988) (permitting interbranch appointments); see also Act of
June 24, 1898, ch. 495 § 2, 30 Stat.487, current version at 28 U.S.C.546(d) (providing for
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Others might object that I am missing a crucial distinction be
tween criminal prosecutions and the kinds of cases in which the
Court has erected its standing doctrine: unlike criminal prosecu
tions, the Court�s standing cases have often involved actions against
an official of the federal government seeking to control that offi
cial's action. I concede, of course, that many (though certainly not
all) of the Court's standing cases have involved federal officials as
defendants and that the Court seems particularly concerned about
using the judicial power to enforce the public interest against such
officials.98 But this distinction turns back on itself. If it is the de
fendant's status as a federal official that is driving the decision, it is
even clearer that the issue concerns Article II: Who has the power
to ensure that the official respects the public interest in compliance
with the law?99
Although it may seem odd to even contemplate, another poten
tial candidate for representing the public interest in compliance
with the law is Congress or its members. Despite its oddity, this
approach, unlike the claimed "personal injury" requirement of
Article ill, may help illuminate the difficult area of Congressional
standing.10° For if Congress has the Article I power to create rights
interim appointment of United States Attorney by district court). Yet again, this highlights
that the debate is better focused on Article II than on Article III.

98. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wiidlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) ("[I]n suits against
the government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain."); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (suit against Secretary of Treasury and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
99. See Sunstein, What's Standing, supra note 14, at 231 ("[I]f Article III does indeed
require a personal stake, the identification of the defendant should not matter."). It might be
thought that there is an Article III difference in that "judicial power" does not include the
power to command executive discretion. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803) ("[T]he province of the courts is • . • not to inquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion."). But the scope of executive discre
tion is defined "by the constitution and law," Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 - that is, by Article II
and law enacted pursuant to Article I. Thus Article III is not doing any independent work.
There may nonetheless be an Article III issue lurking here: if both sides of the "v." are
controlled by the same person, the case may be considered feigned. See generally Michael
Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 893, 917-18 (1991) (exploring the possibility that intragovernmental dis
putes are not justiciable but generally rejecting it); William K. Kelley, The Constitutional
Dilemma of Litigation Under the Independent Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1197, 1255
(1999) (arguing that, for Article III purposes, "the better way to consider whether the parties
could properly litigate against one another is . . . whether one of them, or an officer superior
to them, has the authority in law to dictate the outcome without resorting to court").
100. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997) (concluding that members of
Congress lacked standing to challenge the line-item veto, despite an Act of Congress provid
ing for such an action, because they lacked a "personal injury"). See The Supreme Court:
Leading Cases, 111 HARv. L. REv. 197, 218 (1997) ("[T]he law of legislative standing after
Raines is a doctrine fraught with analytical inconsistency and uncertain boundaries."). De
spite a clear opportunity to do so this year, the Court did not attempt to clarify Congressional
standing in Department of Commerce v. United States House ofRepresentatives, 119 S. Ct. 765
(1999). Instead, the court consolidated two cases involving challenges to the use of sampling
in the 2000 census, one brought by the House of Representatives and another brought by
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of action to vindicate the public interest and Article III permits fed
eral courts to hear such actions, it might seem - unless we adopt a
unitary view of the executive under Article II
that Congress
could give itself (or its members) such rights of action against exec
utive officials. But if we stop looking for a "personal injury" that
we mistakenly think Article III requires, we might more profitably
inform our analysis of congressional standing by asking other ques
tions: Has Congress actually provided for such a right of action
and, if not, is it appropriate for the judiciary to create one?101 May
Congress or its members constitutionally be empowered to bring
actions to vindicate the public interest in seeing that the law is
obeyed?102
-

various voters. It decided the case brought by the voters on the merits, and, in light of that
disposition, dismissed the case brought by the House for want of a "substantial federal ques
tion," without addressing the standing of the House. Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 779.
Only Justices Stevens and Breyer concluded that the House had standing "to challenge the
validity of the process that will determine the size of each State's Congressional delegation."
Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 789 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting). Although
Justices Ginsburg and Souter agreed with Justice Stevens on the merits, they agreed with the
majority - but without explanation - that the case filed by the House should be dismissed.
Dept. of Commerce, 119 S. Ct. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J, dissenting). It ap
pears that, having lost on the merits in the case brought by the various voters, they accepted
that decision as precedent in the case brought by the House. For an exploration of when a
judge should treat a prior decision in which her position was rejected as a baseline for further
decisions, see Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REv.865 (1998). Cf. Hartnett, supra note 58, at 141-45 (arguing that judges in a
single case should not vote on each issue and accept the majority resolution of each issue, but
instead should adhere to the tradition of simply voting on the judgment).
101. This question seems to have been all but ignored in the congressional standing cases
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (permitting Senate and members of Congress standing to challenge pocket
veto), vacated, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Barnes, 759 F.2d at 41 (Bork, J., dissenting) (decrying
Congressional standing); Moore v. United States House of Rep., 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (permitting members of Congress standing to sue the two Houses and their officers to
enforce the origination clause), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Moore, 733 F.2d at 956
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to such standing); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (permitting member of Congress standing to challenge pocket veto); see also
Chenoworth v. Clinton, 1999 WL 446007 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 1999) (treating reasoning of
Moore and Kennedy as repudiated by Raines). Congress, of course, is not likely to create
rights of action against itself, its Houses, or its officers. Nor is the President likely to sign bills
creating Congressional rights of action against the executive. The major exception would
seem to be if Congress and the President are eager for a judicial resolution of a constitutional
question, as they may have been concerning the line-item veto. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(l)
(Supp. 1998) (providing that any Member of Congress may sue to challenge line-item veto
statute). Such a situation, however, may simply take us out of the standing frying pan into
the advisory opinion fire. See Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing:
Raines v. Byrd and the Modem Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confron
tations, 86 GEO. LJ. 351, 351 (1997) (stating that in enacting a statutory grant of standing to
members of Congress in the 1996 Line Item Veto Act, "Congress effectively asked the Court
. . . to determine whether [the] proposed legislation was constitutional"); Fletcher, supra note
14, at 283-90 (suggesting that when Congress enacts a law providing for Congressional stand
ing, it resembles a request for advisory opinions).
102. Shifting the focus from Article III also offers a way to reconcile the denial of Con
gressional standing in Raines with the recognition of state legislative standing in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (holding that a block of twenty state senators from Kansas had
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Even if Article II permits individuals with considerable indepen
dence from the President to represent the United States and vindi
cate the public interest in court, however, members of Congress
(and Congress itself) could be precluded from exercising this power
themselves. First, if Article II requires that only officers of the
United States represent the United States in vindicating the public
interest in court,103 then the incompatibility clause104 prevents
members of Congress from bringing such actions. But even if such
a litigant need not be an officer, it does not follow that such a liti
gant can be a member of Congress. The Supreme Court has been
far more tolerant when Congress gives law enforcement powers to
those with some independence from the president than when it at
tempts to give itself or its members a role in the enforcement of the
law.105
standing to seek to compel a state official to certify that a federal constitutional amendment
had not been ratified where the state senate voted twenty to twenty and the Lieutenant
Governor cast a deciding vote in favor of the amendment). In Coleman, which involved state
legislators, there was no federal separation of powers issue. Cf. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319-20
& n.8 {distinguishing Coleman on the grounds that the voting block in Coleman was sufficient
to control the outcome if they were correct that the Lieutenant Governor was not part of the
legislature for purposes of ratifying a federal constitutional amendment, and noting that it
"need not decide whether Coleman may also be distinguished" on the ground that it "has no
applicability to a similar suit brought by federal legislators, since the separation-of-powers
concerns present in such a suit were not present in Coleman").
Of course, there is always the question whether any particular Congressionally-created
right of action is best understood as an attempt to empower itself or its members to vindicate
the public interest. Cf. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that members of Congress are "not simply claiming harm to their interest in having
government abide by the Constitution," and that it is "fairly debatable" whether their injury
is "sufficiently personal and concrete to give them standing" and therefore "resolv[ing] the
question under more general separation-of-power principles").
103. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
104. U.S. CoNsT.art. I, § 6 ("(N]o Person holding Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."). For an argument that the
incompatibility clause is "the cornerstone of the entire American constitutional structure,"
see Steven G.Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation ofPowers or
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1045, 1157 {1994). While the Supreme Court
has held that citizens and taxpayers lack standing to bring an action challenging Congres·
sional membership in the military reserve based on the incompatibility clause, Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), this does not mean that a court
should ignore the incompatibility clause when adjudicating a claim brought by a member of
Congress. Reservists, like other standing decisions, is better understood as a judicial refusal
to create a public right of action to enforce the incompatibility clause; it should not bar a
defensive challenge to the authority of a member of Congress under that clause. There is a
significant difference between creating a right of action and recognizing that a defendant may
object to the constitutional authority of the plaintiff to bring the action against him. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 73, at 816 n.3 (suggesting that there is a difference between af·
firmative rights of action and defenses); Calabresi & Larsen, supra, at n.12 (stating that if a
member of Congress was acting as an officer of the United States and "taking government
action that bore down on the life, liberty, or property rights of a private individual . • • we
would have no doubt that the private individual so affected would have standing to defend
against the government action on the ground that it was unconstitutional because of a viola·
tion of the Incompatibility Clause.").
105. See supra note 96.
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is unduly optimistic to think that there is any hope of
dislodging the current standing doctrine. After all, scholars far
more prominent than I have been trying for years. But there are
glimmers of hope, and those glimmers have appeared (I think) pre
cisely in the cracks of standing doctrine explored above.
First, Justice Souter has observed that the injury-in-fact require
ment is very difficult to apply sensibly to official capacity actions.106
This observation is a step toward recognizing that the injury-in-fact
requirement cannot be sensibly applied as an Article III require
ment to any case which seeks to vindicate the public interest in law
enforcement.
Second, Justice Stevens has observed that what really seems to
be motivating Justice Scalia's views on standing is his commitment
to a unitary theory of Article II.107 This observation is a step to
ward recognizing that what is really at stake in current standing
doctrine has everything to do with Articles I and II, and nothing to
do with the meaning of "case" and "controversies" in Article III.
Finally, while the Court last year retained an Article III bar to
standing where the "harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is
also of an abstract and indefinite nature - for example, harm to
the common concern for obedience to law,"108 it also made clear
that in other circumstances, Congress can authorize standing to liti
gate a generalized grievance. In so doing, it partially retreated from
the view of Article III articulated by Justice Scalia for the Court in
Lujan. Once the retreat has begun, there is greater hope, perhaps,
for its continuance.109
106. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There is,
first, difficulty in applying the rule that an injury on which standing is predicated be personal,
not official."); Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 n.2 ("[A]n injury to official authority may support
standing for a government itself or its duly authorized agents."). The cases which Justice
Souter relies upon to support the standing of officials, however, are cases that arose in the
context of a state official seeking review in the Supreme Court of the United States, in his
official capacity, of a judgment of his own state's court. For a discussion of these cases argu
ing that the Supreme Court should not have abandoned its earlier doctrine barring such cases
from its jurisdiction, see Edward A. Hartnett, Why ls the Supreme Court of the United States
Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEXAS L. REv. 907, 957-71 (1997).
107. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83, 129 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court might be
"rooted in another separation of powers concern: that this citizen suit somehow interferes
with the Executive's power to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"').
108. Federal Election Commn. v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1785 (1998) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
109. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 12, at 262-63 (applauding the "subtle move away"
from Lujan in Akins, while noting failure to "retreat squarely from it"); Sunstein, supra note
12, at 674 (proclaiming that "the Akins decision deserves a more general celebration").
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Focusing on Articles I and II rather than Article III does not
provide any simple answers. But we certainly have a far better
chance of finding the right answers if we stop looking in the wrong
place.

